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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
LABOR RELATIONS--EXCLUSIVENESS OF JURISDICTION OF LABOR RELA-
TIONS BOARD--REDRESS OF INJURY FROM ALLEGED LIBEL IN COURSE OF
LABOR ORGANIZATION CAMPAIGN THROUGH STATE REMEDIE.-Before the
Court in the case of Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local
114, - U.S. -, 86 Sup. Ct. 657 (1966), was the question of whether the
National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction of a labor
organizing campaign to the extent that a libel arising therefrom could not
be redressed by a state remedy. The Court held that Congress had not
preempted the courts from applying state remedies for libel by passing the
National Labor Relations Act;' however, the Court limited recovery to
those cases where the statements allegedly constituting the libel were made
with malice and had caused actual damage.
The plaintiff, Linn, was an assistant general manager of Pinkerton's
National Detective Agency, Inc. During an organizing campaign, two union
officials and a Pinkerton guard allegedly distributed circulars defaming
him. 2 The Pinkerton National Detective Agency, Inc. filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the Regional Director of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board alleging that the distribution of these circulars, along with
other material, was in violation of the National Labor Relations Act. How-
ever, the Director refused to issue a complaint because he found no evi-
dence that the union had been responsible for the distribution of the cir-
culars.
Subsequent to filing the charge with the Regional Director, Linn
instituted an action for libel in a federal district court. The district court
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the National Labor Relations
Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter, and that a state
remedy for libel could not be applied by the courts. It held that San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon8 was controlling. The district court's
decision was affirmed by the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals.4
1 Footnote 3 of the Court in Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local
114, - U.S. -, -, 86 Sup. Ct. 657, 661 (1966) contains an adequate paraphrase of the Act.
It states:
The Congress has declared in the Act that employees have the right to self-organ-
ization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for mutual aid and protection. §7. In § 8(a)
Congress has made it an unfair labor practice for an employer to restrain or co-
erce employees in the exercise of § 7 rights. Likewise, § 8(b) protects these rights
against interference by a labor organization or its agents. And § 8(c) provides that
the expression of any views or opinions "shall not constitute or be evidence of an
unfair labor practice ... if such expression contains no threat or reprisal or force
or promise of benefit." In addition, § 9(c)(1) authorizes- the Board, under certain
conditions, to conduct representation elections and certify the results thereof.
Finally, § 10 grants the Board exclusive power to enforce the prohibitions of the
Act.
2 The circulars charged Pinkerton managers with falsifying records designating the
number of Pinkerton employees. It was also alleged that the managers deprived these un-
listed men of voting rights and pay increases, and that they had lied to the union. Linn
alleged that he was one of the managers referred to in the circulars.
3 359 U.S. 236, 79 Sup. Ct. 773 (1959).
4 337 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964).
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
and remanded,5 concluding that it was not the intent of Congress to pre-
empt the courts from redressing libel arising in a labor dispute. The Court
reasoned that the exercise of state authority in this area would not interfere
with a uniform regulation of labor relations, that malicious libel is a pe-
ripheral concern of the National Labor Relations Board and that the
states have a compelling interest in protecting their citizens from libel.
In reaching this result, the Court said that the problem of determining
whether the states must yield jurisdiction to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board is made ". . .. more difficult by the failure of the Congress
to furnish precise guidance in either the language of the [National Labor
Relations] Act or its legislative history."6 However, in the absence of precise
congressional guidance, the Court noted other factors which had to be
taken into consideration. The Court indicated, by quoting from Garner v.
Teamsters Union,7 the route it must follow.
The ... Act... leaves much to the states, though Congress has
refrained from telling how much. We must spell out from conflict-
ing indications of congressional will the area in which state action
is permissible.8
The Court then noted that ". ... in framing the pre-emption question
before us we [the Court] need look primarily to San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S. Ct. 773 (1959)."9 Quoting again
from the Garmon case, the Court stated that it was for the Board and
Congress to indicate ". . . . the precise and closely limited demarcations
that can be adequately fashioned only by legislation and administration."'1
With these principles in mind, the Court then considered the actions
taken by the National Labor Relations Board in the past with regard to
abusive language used in the course of a labor campaign. In this respect,
the Board had not censored campaign material used in an election, but
rather had left the appraisal of such language to the voters. 1 However,
where the freedom of choice in an election had been restricted by un-
corrected misrepresentations, the Board had taken appropriate measures.'
2
Generally, the Court recognized that the Board had allowed a wide
latitude in the use of abusive or erroneous statements, yet it had held that
5 Linn was directed to amend his complaint by alleging malice and compensatory
damages.
6 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, - US. -, -o 86 Sup.
Ct. 657, 661 (1966).
7 346 U.S. 485, 74 Sup. Ct. 161 (1953).
8 Id. at 488, 74 Sup. Ct. at 164.
9 Supra note 6.
10 Supra note 6.
11 Stewart-Warner Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1953).
12 Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
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one could not circulate material known to be false,' 8 under penalty of for-
feiting any protection afforded by the National Labor Relations Act.
4
In view of these considerations, the Court felt that redressing a libel, cir-
culated with malice in the course of a labor campaign, would be merely a
peripheral concern of the National Labor Relations Board, as the Board
had held that statements made maliciously would cause forfeiture of any
rights under the act.
The Court, however, mindful of the fact that a libel suit or a threat of
filing one could be a coercive weapon in the hands of either a union or
an employer, was meticulous in stating that it was limiting a party's right
to recover to those cases where the allegedly libelous statements were issued
and known to be false or where the statements were issued with reckless
disregard of whether they were true or false. The Court noted that
malicious, defamatory statements can never be condoned.
The right to recover was also limited to those cases where the defamed
party could plead and prove that he had suffered actual damage. One of
the Court's reasons is, perhaps, best stated by its own words.
As we have pointed out, certain language characteristic of
labor disputes may be held actionable per se in some state courts.
. . . However, even in those jurisdictions, the amount of damages
which may be recovered depends upon evidence as to the severity
of the resulting harm. This is a salutary principle.' 5
The Court also felt that the requirement of proof of actual damage would
prevent the use of a libel action as a coercive weapon in labor disputes.
The position that redressing libel is only a peripheral concern of the
National Labor Relations Board is strengthened by the fact that an indi-
vidual has no standing in a Board hearing and that injury to an individual's
reputation has no relevance to the Board's functions.' 6 The Court recog-
nized this situation and concluded that the states have a compelling interest
in protecting their citizens from libel.
Mr. Justice Black dissented on the grounds that free speech was
abridged and that the decision would have a marked effect on collective
bargaining. He felt that the use of a libel suit as a weapon would result in
the destruction of effective labor arbitration.
Mr. Justice Fortas, with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas
joined, dissented on the grounds that congressional intent had been abro-
gated. They feared that the use of libel suits would result in increased war-
1 See Maryland Drydock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 183 F.2 538 (4th Cir. 1950).
14 Walls Mfg. Co.. 137 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1962).
15 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, - U.S. -, 86 Sup.
Ct. 657, 664 (1966).
16 Cf. Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 US. 261, 60 Sup.
Ct. 561 (1940).
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fare between labor and management. They accepted, however, the proposi-
tion that a person should be protected from defamation when he is not a
party to a labor campaign or when the defamatory matter is not confined to
any issue in dispute.
The majority of the Court was of the opinion that the state courts and
the National Labor Relations Board act within independent spheres of
jurisdiction. While state courts award damages for libel, the National Labor
Relations Board oversees elections in labor campaigns. As neither the state
courts nor the Board act within the same sphere, condemnation by a state
court in a libel action would not reflect a similar judgment by the Board
on the objectives of the parties to the labor dispute.
An individual libeled and damaged during the course of a labor dis-
pute has now been afforded a right to redress his injury by state remedies.
However, the preservation of this right is bound to have some effect on
labor arbitration. It will become more difficult to deal constructively with
new problems while old battles are still being fought in other forums. It is
not an empty threat to resort to the state courts as an auxilliary weapon in
resolving labor disputes. False claims could be filed for tactical purposes.
Tenuous as the claims may be, time and expense will still be needed to com-
bat them.
Yet, it would be unreasonbale to deny a person compensation for dam-
ages merely because the libel arose in a labor dispute. Quite naturally then,
it is apparent that a balance must be maintained between the promotion of
effective arbitration and the protection of an individual's reputation. It is
this writer's opinion that a balance was maintained when the Court in the
instant case limited the individual's right of redress to those cases where
the libel was maliciously asserted and did in fact cause damage. This re-
striction would tend to cut down on the possibility of false claims being
asserted, and it would in no way limit effective campaigning which of neces-
sity must be based on open and free discussion. Only statements in the
course of such open and free discussion which are made maliciously were-
proscribed -by the Court in the Linn case.
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